ASSESSMENT: June 2025 Pre-War Signals vs. February 2026 — Escalation and Negotiation Patterns

Date: 2026-02-08 Classification: OPEN SOURCE Overall Confidence: Medium (degraded by demonstrated June 2025 deception precedent) Source Basis: Open-source analysis without field verification

CRITICAL ANALYTICAL CAVEAT: The June 2025 deception campaign — in which the US and Israel conducted five rounds of genuine-seeming negotiations while simultaneously finalizing strike plans — has permanently degraded the reliability of surface-level signals in this analytical space. This assessment cannot reliably distinguish coercive diplomacy from adapted strike preparation using available open-source methods. All probability estimates below should be read with this limitation foregrounded.

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

February 2026 likely represents a shift from the June 2025 covert dual-track (negotiations-as-cover for planned strikes) toward overt coercive diplomacy where military threats are wielded openly as negotiating leverage. However, this assessment carries only medium confidence because a learning adversary would be expected to adapt its deception methodology, and the key evidence distinguishing the two periods (overt vs. covert posture, absence of a formal deadline) is not robust against an evolved deception approach. The probability of a second military strike within 90 days is assessed at 30-35% — meaningfully higher than coercive-diplomacy-only models suggest, reflecting irreducible uncertainty about US-Israeli coordination and Trump's decision-making. The February 12 Netanyahu-Trump meeting and the IAEA Q1 Board of Governors session are the two most diagnostic near-term events.

KEY JUDGMENTS

1. The February 2026 escalation pattern is structurally similar to but behaviorally distinct from June 2025.

   • Likelihood: Likely (55-80%)
   • Confidence: Medium
   • Basis: Both periods feature military buildup + negotiations + deadline pressure. But June 2025 was characterized by concealed offensive preparations and active deception; February 2026 features overt, declaratory force posturing and visible negotiations. The behavioral shift is real but may reflect adapted methodology rather than different intent.

2. Negotiations in June 2025 were structurally insincere — operating as a subordinate track to pre-planned military action. In February 2026, the talks are more substantive but still primarily instrumental.

   • Likelihood of February 2026 talks producing a framework agreement: Unlikely (20-35%)
   • Confidence: Medium
   • Basis: June 2025 talks served three cover functions (diplomatic, operational, political). February 2026 talks show marginally higher sincerity indicators (face-to-face format, enrichment consortium discussions, no preset deadline) but are undermined by same-day sanctions, CENTCOM coercive signaling, and structural impediments to a ZOPA. The talks are best characterized as "coercive theater" — more than pure cover, less than genuine problem-solving.

3. Trump and Netanyahu are probably not fully aligned on objectives, unlike in June 2025 — but this divergence may be less durable than it appears.

   • Likelihood of genuine US-Israel divergence on Iran: Roughly even chance (45-55%)
   • Confidence: Medium
   • Basis: Domestic political incentives diverge: Trump faces 70% opposition to strikes (37% approval); Netanyahu faces October 2026 elections where maintaining the Iran threat is his strongest card. But the June 2025 precedent showed surface divergence masking coordination, and the February 12 meeting could resolve the divergence in either direction.

4. Iran's proxy network collapse is the most consequential and durable change between the two periods, fundamentally reducing the retaliatory cost of any US/Israeli military action.

   • Likelihood: Almost certainly (>95%) that proxy degradation persists for 12+ months
   • Confidence: High
   • Basis: Syria land bridge severed, Hezbollah partially disarmed, Houthis dormant since September 2025, Iraqi militias inactive. Multiple independent sources confirm. This removes the multi-front escalation calculus that constrained June 2025 planning.

5. Iran's extreme weakness paradoxically makes a deal harder, not easier, to reach.

   • Likelihood of "weakened adversary" dynamic preventing agreement: Likely (55-80%)
   • Confidence: Medium-High
   • Basis: US maximalist demands (zero enrichment, missile limits, proxy cessation) approach capitulation terms no Iranian leadership can accept during a domestic legitimacy crisis. Historical precedent (Versailles, post-Gulf War Iraq) consistently shows that extreme asymmetry produces rigidity, not flexibility, in the weaker party.

6. A second military strike, if it occurs, would produce diminishing strategic returns compared to June 2025.

   • Likelihood: Highly likely (80-95%) that second strikes would be less effective
   • Confidence: High
   • Basis: Iraq multi-strike precedent (1981-2003) demonstrates successive strikes face dispersed, hardened targets. Iran has had 8 months to adapt. Khorramshahr-4 deployed in underground "missile cities." The reconstitution cycle (rebuild in 8 months) would repeat.

7. The February 12 Netanyahu-Trump meeting is the single most diagnostic near-term event for distinguishing coercive diplomacy from coordinated strike preparation.

   • Confidence: High
   • Basis: The February 2025 meeting was the operational planning kickoff for June 2025 strikes. The December 2025 Mar-a-Lago meeting may have served the same function for "round two." February 12 is either a coordination session or a lobbying effort — the output will clarify.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment compares the escalation and negotiation dynamics of June 2025 (the pre-war period that culminated in US-Israeli strikes on Iran) with February 2026 (the current period) across two tracks: visible escalation signals and political signaling about negotiation sincerity.

Track 1 — Escalation Signals: Similar Structure, Different Character

Both periods feature a US military buildup paired with diplomatic engagement and economic pressure. The February 2026 force posture — USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, 12+ warships, dozens of aircraft, USS George H.W. Bush en route — constitutes the second-largest US deployment to the Middle East since the Iraq War. However, the character of the buildup differs fundamentally. June 2025 was marked by concealed preparations, active deception (planted false reports of US-Israel tensions), and a strike architecture based on strategic assets (B-2 bombers from Missouri). February 2026 is marked by overt, declaratory posturing, no detected deception campaign, and a theater-based architecture (carrier aviation, regional bases). This behavioral difference is the strongest argument that the current posture is coercive diplomacy rather than concealed strike preparation — but the red team challenge demonstrates that a learning adversary would adapt precisely by making preparations overt, exploiting the lesson analysts learned from June 2025.

The most significant escalation change: kinetic incidents. Before the June 13, 2025, strikes, there were zero kinetic engagements between the US and Iran. In February 2026, the Shahed-139 drone shootdown near USS Abraham Lincoln and IRGC gunboat harassment of the Stena Imperative (both February 3), followed by tanker seizures at Farsi Island (February 5), represent the first kinetic exchanges since the war. These are assessed as deliberate Iranian capability demonstrations and pre-negotiation signaling, not the opening phase of military escalation — but they qualitatively change the environment.

Track 2 — Negotiation Sincerity: From Covert Insincerity to Overt Ambiguity

The June 2025 negotiations were, with high confidence, structurally insincere from the US-Israeli side. The 60-day deadline was a predetermined trigger, not a genuine ultimatum. Strike planning predated the first round of talks by three months. The deception campaign was deliberate and comprehensive. The "final secret proposal" transmitted during the bombing itself confirms the negotiations' subordination to the military track.

February 2026 negotiations show marginally higher sincerity indicators: the shift to face-to-face contact, Kushner's inclusion signaling presidential-level investment, the enrichment consortium concept as a potential ZOPA, and critically, the absence of a formal deadline. These suggest the talks are not a carbon copy of the 2025 cover operation. But the same-day sanctions announcement, CENTCOM's coercive presence at the table, Iran's continued IAEA refusal, and the structural impediments to any deal Iran can accept all indicate that the talks serve time-buying and narrative-building functions for both sides. The most accurate characterization is "coercive diplomacy where both sides are simultaneously negotiating and hedging."

Where the Two Periods Look Similar:

• Military buildup paired with diplomatic engagement
• Economic pressure (sanctions) escalating concurrent with talks
• Gulf state mediation attempting to prevent conflict
• Iran rebuilding/reconstituting while negotiating
• Netanyahu pushing for military action
• Structural impossibility of a comprehensive deal on current terms

Where They Differ:

• Force posture visibility: covert (2025) vs. overt (2026)
• Deception: active campaign (2025) vs. none detected (2026)
• Deadline structure: predetermined trigger (2025) vs. no formal deadline (2026)
• Iran's position: near-breakout nuclear power (2025) vs. catastrophically weakened across all dimensions (2026)
• Proxy network: functional (2025) vs. collapsed (2026)
• Kinetic incidents: zero (pre-June 2025) vs. active (February 2026)
• Negotiation format: indirect only (2025) vs. face-to-face with military (2026)
• US domestic politics: more permissive (2025) vs. 70% oppose action (2026)
• Iran's domestic situation: repressive stability (2025) vs. existential protest crisis (2026)

HYPOTHESES EVALUATED

KEY ACTORS & PERSPECTIVES

United States (Trump / Witkoff / Kushner)

Speaking as the US administration: We are in the strongest position any administration has held against Iran. Nuclear program set back years, proxies shattered, economy in freefall, regime fighting its own people. The question is whether to press for a deal or finish the job. We prefer a deal — Trump wants to be the dealmaker — but our definition of "deal" is Iran's capitulation wrapped in diplomatic packaging. If they won't capitulate, the military option is ready. We brought our carrier, our warships, and our CENTCOM commander to the negotiating table to make sure they understand the alternative.

Iran (Khamenei / IRGC / Araghchi)

Speaking as Iran's leadership: We are wounded but alive. They struck hard enough to hurt us but not hard enough to finish us — and that was their mistake. We now operate under the assumption that all American and Israeli diplomatic engagement may be cover for military planning. We sat in Muscat not trusting a single word from people whose last "negotiation" was a deception operation. Our strategy is to buy time, rebuild our deterrent, and survive. We cannot capitulate — our people are already in the streets, and surrender would accelerate our fall, not prevent it.

Israel (Netanyahu)

Speaking as Netanyahu: The June strikes were phase one. Iran is rebuilding faster than expected — 2,000 missiles in eight months, Chinese supply chains, underground deployments. If we wait, the window closes again. I need Trump to authorize round two before Iran reconstitutes what we destroyed. My February 12 meeting is about making the case that diplomacy has run its course and military action is necessary before October — before my election, and before Iran's missiles are back to full strength.

Saudi Arabia (MBS)

Speaking as MBS: Another war is the last thing we need. Iran is weak — we can get concessions through economic pressure and diplomacy that we could never have gotten before. A strike would rally Iranian nationalism, kill the protest movement, and create regional instability that threatens every investment I've made. I'm lobbying Washington hard: give diplomacy a real chance. A weakened Iran managed through engagement is more valuable to Saudi interests than a destroyed Iran that spawns chaos.

SCENARIOS

INDICATORS TO WATCH

INFORMATION GAPS

Critical unknowns that affect confidence:

• Trump's actual decision threshold for military action (even senior officials say objectives unclear)
• Content and substance of the February 12 Netanyahu-Trump meeting
• Whether there is an internal US-Israeli strike timeline (invisible to open-source methods)
• Iran's actual nuclear reconstitution progress (IAEA denied access to struck sites)
• IRGC command-and-control recovery and factional positions on negotiations
• China's diplomatic and military-supply role behind the scenes
• Current Iranian TEL inventory (critical for assessing retaliatory capability)
• USS George H.W. Bush arrival timeline

Collection priorities:

• Track USS George H.W. Bush transit — dual-carrier presence is the most unambiguous strike indicator
• Monitor February 12 meeting: duration, format, participants, post-meeting military activity
• Track IAEA Board of Governors Q1 2026 session and pre-session diplomatic maneuvering
• Monitor for combat support asset deployments (CSAR, medevac, ammunition pre-positioning)
• Track Round 2 scheduling — sustained cadence favors diplomacy; delay favors strike

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

DISSENTING VIEWS

Where analysts disagreed:

RED TEAM CAVEAT

The red team challenge partially succeeded. It demonstrated that:

1. The prevailing assessment's confidence level is unjustified given the deception detection limitations
2. The strike probability was underestimated (raised from 20% to 30-35%)
3. The "overt vs. covert" distinction is not diagnostic against a learning adversary
4. Gulf constraints are historically ineffective
5. Analyst convergence on H2+H3 may reflect shared assumptions rather than independent assessment

The red team's "Adapted Dual-Track" alternative — where the December 2025 meeting was the planning kickoff, overt posturing is the new form of cover, and the IAEA Q1 Board is the institutional trigger — is internally consistent and cannot be excluded. It is maintained as a formal dissent position.

PRE-MORTEM CAVEAT

The pre-mortem exercise identified the most plausible failure mode: the assessment is wrong because it treated overt military posturing as evidence of coercive intent when it was, in fact, an adapted form of strike preparation that exploited analysts' learned lesson from June 2025. The pre-mortem identified three indicators that should have tipped us off: (1) the USS George H.W. Bush deployment exceeding coercive requirements, (2) the February 12 meeting being a coordination session rather than lobbying, and (3) the non-scheduling of Oman Round 2 while military buildup continued.

These three indicators should be monitored with the understanding that their realization would require fundamental reassessment.

Analysis conducted using structured analytical methodology (collection → hypotheses → domain analysis → structured analysis → red team/pre-mortem → synthesis) Source basis: Open-source intelligence (OSINT) without field verification Supporting materials in subfolders — see _index.md for full analysis trail Six domain analysts deployed: military, signals, negotiation, political, historical, perspective Red team challenge incorporated with probability adjustments and formal dissent preserved