Negotiation Analysis: Exit Strategies and Off-Ramps

See full analysis in agent output. Key findings summarized in _ASSESSMENT.md

Key Findings

• Feb 27 "breakthrough" was real but insufficient — Iran offered nuclear material concessions; US demanded total transformation (nuclear + missiles + proxies + human rights). These could never converge.
• Strike was planned for Feb 21 (before final talks round). At minimum, military track was running independently of diplomatic track.
• Current minimum positions are incompatible: US demands end of nuclear capability; Iran demands to retain it. US wants regime change; Iran demands regime survival.
• Turkey emerging as most active mediator (FM Fidan called 7 FMs). Oman's credibility damaged but still trusted by Iran. Italy probe rejected.
• Negotiation window not yet open (Day 3). Likely opens around Day 10-14 when both sides have demonstrated capability.
• Most realistic off-ramp: Korean Armistice model — ceasefire without resolving underlying issues, followed by prolonged negotiations.
• Spoilers: Netanyahu (election-year incentive to continue) and IRGC hardliners (institutional survival) are most dangerous because they operate inside decision-making apparatus.
• Nuclear deal component is necessary for any sustainable ceasefire — Trump needs it to declare victory.
• Trust deficit is catastrophic: using talks as cover for strikes destroyed US credibility as negotiating partner for a generation.
• Ceasefire probability within 6 weeks: 30-45%. Grinding attrition without clean off-ramp: 55-65%.