Perspective Simulation: Iran and United States — February 2026

Analyst: perspective-simulator Date: 2026-02-08

IRAN'S PERSPECTIVE (Khamenei / IRGC / Araghchi Composite)

How Iran Viewed June 2025

Iran believed it held strong cards: nine weapons' worth of 60%-enriched uranium, functional proxy network, ongoing negotiations with counteroffer in preparation. The regime almost certainly underestimated the likelihood of a strike — the US-Israeli deception campaign (fake tensions) appears to have worked. The June 13 strikes were a strategic shock. Killing of IRGC chiefs Salami, Bagheri, Hajizadeh, and injury to Shamkhani (the man overseeing negotiations) was both operationally devastating and symbolically humiliating.

Iran's June 2025 blind spot: Assumed negotiations provided some protection — that talks and strikes were either/or, not simultaneous tracks.

How Iran Views February 2026

Speaking as Iran's leadership:

We are wounded but alive. They struck hard enough to hurt us but not hard enough to finish us. We now operate under the assumption that all American and Israeli diplomatic engagement may be cover for military planning. This is not paranoia — it is the documented lesson of June 2025.

In Muscat on February 6, we did not sit across from a negotiating partner. We sat across from an adversary whose last "negotiation" was a deception operation. Every signal must be decoded for its hidden military meaning — Cooper at the table was a threat delivered in person, same-day sanctions were a message, the carrier deployment is positioning.

We face an impossible trilemma: negotiate from extreme weakness, rebuild under surveillance, or absorb another strike we may not survive politically. Every option requires time we do not have.

Iran's most likely strategy: Option B — negotiate to buy time — with elements of controlled escalation as leverage. Araghchi's "good start" signals no quick resolution. Missile rebuild and IAEA refusal indicate Iran using negotiation window to reconstitute deterrence.

What would change Iran's calculus:

• Toward genuine negotiation: Verifiable sanctions relief before concessions; regime-change commitment removed; nuclear-only file
• Toward escalation: Confirmed intelligence strikes are coming regardless; domestic crisis requiring external distraction
• Toward capitulation: Nothing — but disguised concessions ("voluntary transparency") possible if dignity preserved

Iran's blind spots: Overlearning from June 2025 (may miss genuine off-ramp); underestimating domestic fragility (treating protests as security not political problem); overestimating China's commitment; missile rebuild may not change strategic equation given interception rates.

US ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE (Trump / Witkoff / Kushner Composite)

How the US Viewed June 2025

Clear dual-track: 60-day deadline was genuine in that Trump wanted a deal if Iran would capitulate, but "capitulate" was the operative word. Strike planning ran simultaneously. The timing was choreographed — strikes one day after deadline expiry, three days before scheduled sixth round. The "final secret proposal" during bombing was to justify "we tried everything."

How the US Views February 2026

Speaking as the Trump administration:

We are in the strongest position any US administration has ever held vis-à-vis Iran. Nuclear program set back years. Proxy network shattered. Economy in freefall. Largest protests since 1979. Military leadership decapitated. The question is whether to press for a deal while Iran is this weak, or finish the job.

Iran is playing for time. The February 6 talks confirmed this. Meanwhile they're rebuilding to 2,000 missiles with Chinese help and refusing IAEA access. The February 3 drone and tanker incidents were probes — not the behavior of a regime ready for peace.

Our strategy is "negotiate from overwhelming strength": military coercion (the armada), economic strangulation (maximum pressure), diplomatic engagement (Oman as face-saving venue), and domestic leverage (the protest movement as force multiplier).

The optimal outcome is Iranian capitulation disguised as a negotiated agreement — Trump gets "bigger deal than Obama" while Iran gives up enrichment, missiles, and proxies. Kushner signals the grand bargain ambition: normalize Iran's regional relations in exchange for total concessions.

What would constitute US "success":

• Maximum: Verifiable nuclear dismantlement, missile limits, proxy cessation, regional normalization
• Acceptable: IAEA access, enrichment freeze, missile restraint; partial sanctions relief
• Military fallback: Second strikes permanently disabling missile production and nuclear infrastructure

US blind spots: "Rational capitulation" assumption may be wrong (cornered regimes make unpredictable choices); overestimating June 2025 model's repeatability (dispersed targets, diminishing returns); underestimating protest movement's independence (US strike would suppress it via nationalist rallying); "unclear objectives" is a strategic vulnerability, not a feature; Gulf opposition is interest-based, not performative; sanctions-after-talks may backfire by validating Iranian hardliners.

How Each Side Misreads the Other

Key Diagnostic Indicator

The February 12 Netanyahu-Trump meeting is the single most diagnostic event for distinguishing between H1 (Repeat Playbook) and H3 (Divergent Principals). If the second round of Oman talks occurs quickly and the US refrains from simultaneous escalation, this favors H2/H3. If delayed while military buildup continues, H1 becomes dominant.