MILITARY ASSESSMENT: Likelihood of US-Israel Military Action Against Iran Before Nowruz

Analyst: Military-analyst domain specialist Date: February 10, 2026 Classification: Open-source assessment

1. SITUATION: What We Observe

Force Disposition

US Forces in Theater (as of Feb 10, 2026):

• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) carrier strike group in the Gulf of Oman since January 25-26. Includes guided-missile destroyers USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., USS Michael Murphy, USS Spruance (DDG-111), plus F/A-18E Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers, E-2 Hawkeyes, and F-35C Lightning IIs.
• USS McFaul (DDG-74) conducting escort operations in the Strait of Hormuz.
• Second-largest US military buildup in the Middle East since June 2025 strikes.

Israeli Forces:

• Operation Iron Strike authorized by Security Cabinet on January 5, 2026 (5-hour meeting). Remains "authorized but not executed."
• Netanyahu carrying updated strike plans to February 12 Trump meeting. Four options: exclusively Israeli strike, Israel-led with minimal US support, full collaboration, or US-led assault.

Iranian Forces:

• Air defenses: 120 systems destroyed in June 2025 war (~one-third of pre-war total). Partially rebuilt. Bavar-373/S-300 integration claimed (Feb 5) but air defenses remain degraded.
• Missile forces: Replenished to ~2,000 ballistic missiles. Chinese-assisted (2,000 tons sodium perchlorate delivered September 2025).
• IRGC Navy: Active and provocative. Live-fire Strait of Hormuz exercises, attempted tanker seizure (Feb 3), seized two foreign tankers (Feb 5). "Finger on the trigger" rhetoric. Shift to "offensive" doctrine announced.
• Russian deliveries: MiG-29 jets and Mi-28NE gunships received.
• Proxy network: Quds Force coordinating with Houthi leadership. Hezbollah retains 40,000-50,000 fighters but lost strategic capabilities.

Diplomatic Track (Running Simultaneously)

• Feb 6: US-Iran indirect talks in Oman. "Good start." Follow-on discussions agreed.
• Feb 7: Witkoff and Kushner visited USS Abraham Lincoln after talks -- Iran and Oman notified in advance (deliberate signal).
• Feb 9: Iran offered to dilute 60% enriched uranium if "all sanctions" lifted.
• Feb 9: Ali Bagheri stated Iran will NOT transfer enriched uranium to any country.
• Gulf states publicly refused staging ground access for strikes.

The Critical Unknown

400+ kg of 60% enriched uranium -- location unverified since June 10, 2025. This is the single most important intelligence gap. If dispersed and hidden, it fundamentally alters the calculus of any military strike.

2. ASSESSMENT: Likelihood of Military Action Before Nowruz

Overall Assessment: UNLIKELY but not remote (30-40%)

Confidence: MEDIUM

Factors Favoring a Strike

1. Capability is in place. Carrier strike group + B-2 stealth bomber availability provides technical capacity.
2. Iranian vulnerability window is closing. Iran rebuilding air defenses and replenishing missiles monthly.
3. Political alignment. Netanyahu has domestic incentive; Trump has shown willingness (June 2025).
4. CENTCOM commander at negotiating table. Admiral Cooper at Oman talks is textbook coercive diplomacy.
5. Iran's provocations. Tanker seizure attempts and drone incidents could serve as casus belli.

Factors Against a Strike Before Nowruz

1. Diplomacy has opened and is proceeding. Oman talks described as "good start" -- strongest constraining factor.
2. Gulf state opposition is explicit. Saudi Arabia and UAE publicly refused staging ground access.
3. Trump's pattern: maximum pressure for deals, not wars. Carrier deployment consistent with coercive diplomacy.
4. Target degradation. June 2025 strikes already destroyed Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan. Diminishing-value targets remain.
5. Iran's uranium dilution offer. Provides diplomatic oxygen against near-term strike justification.
6. Netanyahu-Trump meeting about shaping the deal, not greenlighting strikes.
7. 38-day window is very compressed without visible Tier 1 pre-strike indicators.

Three Scenarios That Could Shift Probability

• Scenario A: Diplomatic collapse. Probability jumps to 55-65%.
• Scenario B: Intelligence trigger. If 400 kg of enriched uranium located at weaponization facility, >80%.
• Scenario C: Iranian provocation. Fatal confrontation in Strait or Houthi attack on US vessel.

3. IF STRIKES OCCUR: What Form?

Most Likely (60% of strike scenarios): Limited, Targeted

• Targets: Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, enriched uranium storage sites, rebuilt missile facilities, IRGC C2
• Platforms: B-2 with GBU-57 MOP, Tomahawks, F-35Cs
• Scale: 30-50 aimpoints, 24-72 hours

Escalatory (25%): Comprehensive

• All above plus: IRGC Navy, ports, power infrastructure, regime command bunkers
• Requires additional carrier group (not deployed)

Maximum Escalation (15%): Regime Decapitation

• Khamenei bunker complex, IRGC senior leadership, government infrastructure
• Extremely high risk; least likely scenario

Iranian Retaliation

Any strike would produce: ballistic missile salvos against Israel (~2,000 available), Strait of Hormuz closure attempt, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Hezbollah rocket attacks, asymmetric attacks on US bases, cyber operations.

4. WOULD STRIKES "MAKE THE END OF THE TUNNEL MORE VISIBLE"?

Assessment: PARTIALLY CORRECT, with critical caveats

Case FOR: Further degrades conventional deterrent, humiliates regime before a protesting population, accelerates economic collapse, deepens internal rifts, could trigger succession crisis.

Case AGAINST: June 2025 war did NOT produce collapse. Rally-round-the-flag effects. IRGC coercive apparatus maintained control through extreme violence.

Net judgment: Naghibzadeh likely correct that strikes would accelerate long-term decline trajectory. Likely wrong that it would produce near-term clarity about regime's end. Collapse driven primarily by internal dynamics, not external military action.

5. MILITARY INDICATORS TO WATCH

Tier 1 -- HIGH DIAGNOSTIC VALUE

Tier 2 -- MODERATE DIAGNOSTIC VALUE

Critical "Negative" Indicators (Signs strikes NOT imminent)

• Continuation of Oman talks with substantive progress
• Iran agreeing to IAEA inspection access
• Trump publicly praising negotiations
• No second carrier group within 2-3 weeks
• Netanyahu departing without joint military communique

6. OVERALL JUDGMENT

Naghibzadeh's prediction that Israel coordinated with the US will attack Iran before Nowruz is UNLIKELY to materialize (30-40%). Confidence: Medium.

His prediction that strikes would "make the end of the tunnel more visible" is PARTIALLY CORRECT in direction but overstated in magnitude.

Most likely trajectory (next 38 days): Continued coercive diplomacy. Feb 12 Netanyahu-Trump meeting produces joint "diplomacy backed by credible force" posture with deadlines tied to IAEA milestones and next Oman round.

Key caveat: All assessments based on open-source analysis. The missing 400 kg of enriched uranium is a known unknown that could override all other considerations.