Multi-Perspective Analysis: Regional Actor Views

Date: 2026-02-07 | Analyst: perspective-simulator

Israel (Netanyahu Government)

View: Deep alarm. The talks offer Iran a diplomatic lifeline after June strikes set back its nuclear program ~2 years. Every day in negotiations is a day Iran rebuilds.

Greatest fear: A deal that addresses only enrichment while leaving ballistic missiles (which can reach Israeli cities) off the table. Araghchi has already declared missiles non-negotiable.

Likely actions: (1) Continue feeding intelligence to U.S. showing Iranian cheating/reconstruction; (2) Lobby for maximalist demands Iran cannot accept; (3) Prepare unilateral strike capability; (4) Publicly predict failure to shape expectations.

Key quote: Netanyahu told Witkoff Iran wants to "kill time... to transfer offensive weapons to hiding places."

Confidence: High

Saudi Arabia

View: Strongest advocate for diplomacy. Invested in Vision 2030, cannot afford another regional war that threatens oil infrastructure and economic transformation.

Greatest fear: Iranian retaliation hitting Gulf infrastructure if U.S. strikes resume. Extraordinary signal: Saudi reportedly pledged it would not retaliate if Iran targets only U.S. bases (not Saudi cities).

Likely actions: Continue lobbying both sides for diplomacy; facilitate Omani mediation; resist being drawn into U.S.-Iran conflict.

Key fact: ~9 regional governments lobbied the White House to save the talks when they nearly collapsed Feb 4.

Confidence: High

UAE

View: Publicly supportive of diplomacy ("Middle East doesn't need another conflict" -- Gargash), but privately more ambiguous. Some in UAE security establishment may welcome further degradation of Iranian capabilities.

Greatest fear: Being targeted by Iranian retaliation.

Divergence from Saudi: Less forceful in lobbying against strikes. The Saudi-UAE split on Iran policy is real and growing.

Confidence: Medium (genuinely ambiguous position)

EU/E3 (UK, France, Germany)

View: Sidelined and struggling for relevance. The E3's decision to trigger snapback UN sanctions (Sept 2025) and the IRGC terrorist designation (Jan 2026) burned their bridges with Tehran. Araghchi explicitly rejected E3 participation.

Greatest fear: Permanent irrelevance in Iran policy. Any deal will affect European security (Iranian missiles can reach Europe, NPT implications).

Likely actions: Publicly support talks; privately lobby Washington to include European concerns; seek back-channel re-entry through Oman.

Confidence: Medium-High

Russia

View: Strategic opportunism. Talks serve Russian interests regardless of outcome. If they succeed, it validates Russia's anti-unilateral-strike position. If they fail, Iran becomes more dependent on Moscow.

Key action: Trilateral strategic charter with Iran and China (Jan 29) -- joint naval exercises scheduled for late February in Gulf of Oman.

Limitation: Will not go to war for Iran. Strategic partnership is real but limited.

Confidence: Medium

China

View: Pragmatic calculation driven by oil imports (1.38M bpd from Iran at $8-10/bbl discount). Wants to maintain discounted oil access while avoiding regional war that would devastate energy markets.

Ideal outcome: Prolonged negotiation that keeps tensions manageable, maintains oil access, prevents both a nuclear-armed Iran and American-imposed regime change.

Vulnerability: Severe secondary sanctions on major Chinese banks (not just teapot refineries) could force recalibration.

Confidence: Medium-High

Iranian Reformists (Pezeshkian, Araghchi)

View: Fighting for regime survival on two fronts. Externally: June strikes, military threats, carrier strike group. Internally: largest protests since 1979, economic ruin.

Motivation: "Every day of negotiation is a day without bombs."

Constraint: Insist on nuclear-only agenda to protect missile deterrent (the one capability that wasn't fully destroyed in June).

Key signal: Khamenei's approval + Shamkhani endorsing Araghchi as "skilled, strategic and trustworthy" = extraordinary authorization.

Confidence: Medium-High

Iranian Hardliners (IRGC)

View: "This is capitulation dressed as diplomacy." The IRGC bled for regime survival during the protests and now the government is rewarding the Americans who bombed them.

Key quote: IRGC's Javani: "Although Iran has come to the negotiating table, it has no intention of giving up its military power."

Greatest fear: Not that talks will fail, but that they might succeed -- and reformists claim credit, marginalizing the IRGC.

Historical pattern: IRGC hardliners have disrupted diplomatic processes more often than they have allowed them to succeed.

Confidence: Medium

Comparative Matrix